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POWERS' OF APPOINTMENT-RESIDUARY CLAUSE
In the recent Federal case of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue,' T had a general testamentary power of
appointment over two trust funds. At the time he made his will, he
had little property of his own. In his will were three clauses of im-
portance. The first one provided: "I give, bequeath, and devise one-
half (1) of all my property of whatever kind, and wherever situ-
ated, owned by me at the time of my death to my wife", etc. The
second provided: "If the total value of all personal property and real
estate, of whatever kind, and wherever situated, owned by me at the
time of my death, shall equal the monetary value of not less than one
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), I give to my Aunt", etc., certain
small specific legacies. The last provided: "I give, bequeath and
devise, after all my just debts and expenses of Administration have
been paid, all the rest, residue and remainder of my property, of what-
ever kind and wherever situated, owned by me at the time of my
death, and which has not already been given, bequeathed, and devised
by and under this will, to K."!
The question in the case was whether a residuary bequest in
common form in T's will operated as an execution of the powers of
appointment which he had over the two trust funds. The court, ap-
plying the Massachusetts law, held that the will was an execution of
the powers. The court said that for many years it has been the set-
tled law in Massachusetts that a general residuary devise operates as
an execution of a power of appointment by will, unless there is some-
thing in the will, when read in the light of surrounding circumstances,
to show that such was not the intention of the donee of the power.
Here, this presumption of executing the power was not overcome
by the fact that certain smaller bequests were made on the condition
that the total value of T's property be not less than one hundred
thousand dollars.
The Massachusetts rule represents a decided contrast to the com-
mon law rule which Is still the law in many states today. The com-
mon law rule on the execution of a power of appointment under an
instrument is: that the intention to execute a power of appointment
must always appear in its execution, either by express terms or re-
citals, or by necessary Implications, so that the transaction is not
fairly susceptible of any other construction, and if such an intention
does not appear the power is deemed to be exercised.2 Three classes
173 Fed. (2nd) 970 (1934).
2 Blagge v. Miles, 3 Fed. Cases No. 1, 479; 1 Story 426 (1841);
Harrison v. Lee, 3 Fed. (2d)' 796 (1925); Lee v. Simpson, 134 U. S. 572,
33 L. Ed. 1038 (1890); Hollister v. Shaw, 46 Conn. 248 (1878); Union
Trust Co. v. Bartlett, 99 Conn. 246, 122 AtI. 105 (1923); Emery v.
Emery, 325 Ill. 212, 156 N.E. 364 (1927) ; Mutual Benevolent Society v.
Clendinen, 44 Md. 429, 22 Am. R. 52 (1876); Patterson v. Wilson, 64
Md. 193, 1 At. 68 (1885); Andrews v. Brimfield, 32"Miss. 107 (1856);
Ackerman v. Ackerman, 81 N. T. Eq. 437, 86 AUt. 542 (1913); Burleigh
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of cases have been held to be sufficient demonstrations of an intended
execution of the power. (1) Where there has been some reference in
the will, or other instrument, to the power,3 or (2) a reference to the
property, which is the subject matter of the power,' or (3) where the
instrument, executed by the donee of the power, would otherwise be
inoperative to its purported extent.5
The common law rules of evidence as to the only ways in which
an intention on the part of the donee to exercise the power, could be
shown, in many cases, actually defeated the intention of the donee
instead of siding it. Courts and writers were outspoken in their cri-
ticism of the rule. As a result of such dissatisfaction, Massachusetts*
as early as 1863 in the case of Amory v. Meredith,7 broke away from
the common law rule and adopted the rule that the donee in making
a will or other instrument is presumed to pass all his property, includ-
ing that which he owns under a power of appointment, unless a con-
trary intention clearly appears in the donee not to exercise the
power.8 New Hampshire' was the only state to follow the Massachu-
setts rule by judicial decision.
The action taken by the Massachusetts court was prophetic of
V. Clough, 52 N. H. 267, 13 Am. R. 23 (1872); Arthur v. Odd Fellows
Beneficial Assn., 29 Ohio St. 557 (1876); Hupp v. Union Coal Co., 284
Pa. 529, 131 Atl. 364 (1925); Wetherill v. Wetherill, 18 Pa. 265 (1852);
Bilderback v. Boyce, 14 S. C. 528 (1880); Arnold v. Sou. Pine Lumber
Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 186, 123 S. W. 1162 (1909).
3 Blake v. Hawkins, 98 U. S. 335, 25 L. Ed. 139 (1878); Lee v.
Simpson (supra, note 2); Solomon v. Wixon, 27 Conn. 520 (1858)
(Power to sell); Whit v. Holly, 80 Conn. 438, 68 Atl. 997 (1908);
Wright v. Syracuse, 0. & N. R. R. Co., 92 Hun. 32, 36 N. Y. S. 901
(1895).
' Blagge v. Miles, Supra note 2. Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 515, 34
Am. R. 136 (1879); Hoff v. Pensenhafer, 190 Ill. 200, 60 N. E. 110
(1901); Henriott v. Cood, 153 Ky. 418, 155 S. W. 701 (1913); Loring
V. Wilson, 174 Mass. 132, 54 N. E. 502 (1899); Munson v. Berdan, 35
N. J. Eq. 376 (1882); Bishop v. Remple, 11 Ohio St. 277 (1860);
Drusadow v. Wilde, 63 Pa. St. Rep. 170 (1869).
5 Lee v. Simpson, Supra note 2; Gossen v. Ladd, 77 Ala. 223
(1884); Reed v. Hollister, 44 Cal. App. 533, 186 Pac. 819 (1919); Hart-
ford.Conn. Trust Co. v. Thayer, 105 Conn. 57, 134 At. 155 (1926);
Henriott v. Cood, Supra note 4; Paul v. Paul, 99 N. J. Eq. 498, 133 Atl.
868 (1926); Denson v. Pine State Creamery Co., 191 N. C. 198, 131
S. E. 581 (1926); Bishop v. Remple, Supra note 4; Moran v. Cornell,
49 R. L 308, 142 Atl. 605 (1928).
G Ames v. Ames, 238 Mass. 270, 130 N. E. 681 (1921); Bangs v.
Smith, 98 Mass. 270 (1867); Cumston v. Bartlett, 149 Mass. 243, 21
N. E. 373 (1389); Hassam v. Hazen, 156 Mass. 93, 30 N. E. 469 (1892);
Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 263, 166 N. E. 549 (1917) ; Sewall v. Wilmer,
132 Mass. 131 (1882); Williad v. Ware, 10 Allen (Mass.) 263 (1865).
17 Allen (Mass.) 397 (1863).
sAndrews v. Brimfield, suggested the rule adopted by Massachu-
setts as early as 1856. See Supra note 2.
'Emery v. Haven, 67 N. H. 503, 35 Atl. 940 (1894); Fitts v. Free
Baptist Society, 75 N. H. 608, 77 Atl. 484 (1910).
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the legislation that was certain to follow. Several states enacted
statutes providing for the same rules on intention as the rule estab-
lished by judicial decision in Massachusetts and New Hampshire."
For the most part these statutes apply only to general powers,1'
and make provisions for a contrary intention.13 In substance they
provide that a general power will be exercised by a general will,'
and they extend to personal as well as real property.1' A residuary
clause makes a will general."
The passage of such a statute does not leave the problem without
its difficulties. It must be remembered that under the latter rule the
donee in making a will or other instrument is only presumed to pass
all the property he has, including that over which he holds a power of
appointment, and this presumption may be rebutted by showing a con-
trary intention on the part of the donee not to exercise it. However,
it is not necessary that the contrary intention provided for by statute
should be expressed; in fact, no cases have been found where it was
so expressed. This contrary intention may be implied from the surround-
ing circumstances, and the fact that only a very few cases have been
found were such an intention existed seems to support the soundness
of the decisions in Massachusetts and New Hampshire and the statutes
whicli have been enacted in the other states.
In an interesting Maryland case the court found a contrary in-
"Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
1 Greenway v. White, 196 Ky. 745, 246 S. W. 137 (1922); Speir v.
Benvenuti, 197 App. Div. 209, 189 N. Y. S. 885 (1921); Trust Co. v.
Livingston, 133 N. Y. 125, 30 N. E. 724 (1892); Hollister v. Hollister, 85
Ore. 316, 166 Pac. 940 (1917); Neill's Estate, 222 Pa. 142, 70 Atl. 942
(1908); In re South's Estate, 248 Pa. 165, 93 Atl. 954 (1915); Thomp-
son Y. Wanamaker, 268 Pa. 203, 110 Atl. 770 (1920); Harlow v. Duryea,
42 R. 1. 234, 107 Atl. 98 (1919) ; Machir v. Funk, 90 Va. 284, 18 S. E. 197
(1893).
12'Lafferty's Estate, 19 Pa. D. P. 504 (1923). The New York
statute applies to all powers of appointment. "Real property em-
braced in a power to devise passes by a will purporting to convey all
the real property of the testator, unless the intent that the will is not
to operate as an execution of the power, appears, either expressly or
by necessary implication." N. Y. Con. Laws (Cahill, 1930), c. 51, s. 176.
Similar provisions as to personal property, c. 42, s. 18.
is In some statutes there is no express provision for a contrary
intention, "Real or personal property embraced in a power to devise
passes by a will purporting to devise all the real or personal property
of the testator." Montana Rev. Codes (Choate, 1921), s. 7029. Pos-
sibly the contrary intention could be made effective under the word
"purporting."
"4The common law rules of intention still apply to execution by
deeds. McCormick v. Security Trust Co., 184 Ky. 25, 211 S. W. 196
(1919).
"Hutton v. Benkard, 92 N. Y. 295 (1883).
'R. I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Dunnell, 34 R. I. 394, 83 Atl. 858
(1912).
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tentonYf In that case T's will contained a residuary clause which
gave all his property to his wife. Thereafter, he executed deeds con-
veying leasehold properties to his wife for life, with specific remainders
to his children and a grandchild, subject to a life estate reserved to
himself, with full power of disposition. Then by a codicil to his will
he made a change in the executorship, but reaffirmed his will in all
other respects. The court found a contrary intention from the facts
that the deeds came after the will, they cut down the interest given
to the wife under the residuary clause, and included persons not pro-
vided for in the will. If T had thought that the future effectiveness
of the deeds depended upon a change in his will, he would not have
resorted to five elaborate deeds, when a change in his will would have
produced the same result. He must have intended the deeds to super-
sede the will.
In view of the fact that the will was executed prior to the crea-
tion of the power, the decision seems right although it is possible that
T had the provisions of the will in mind when he made the deeds.
Certainly the contrary intent is not a necessary implication.
A contrary intention on the part of the donee was found by the
court in a late New York case.s There T conveyed certain securi-
ties by a trust deed to the trustees to pay a part of the income annu-
ally to certain named beneficiaries. The last clause of the deed pro-
vided that all surplus income over these specific payments above
named, should be paid, in quarter-annual installments as long as this
trust shall continue, to the said grantor, or in case he dies before the
termination of the trust (the trust was to continue until the death of
the survivor of the grantor or his wife) to those who may be entitled
thereto by virtue of the will of said grantor, or in case he leaves no
will, to those who may at the time of his death be his next of kin
under the statute of distributions of New York. T thereafter made a
will making certain specific devises and legacies and then the will
contained a residuary clause which purported to dispose of "all rights,
powers, and Interest in, over and concerning property of every kind"
belonging to T at the time of his death, to trustees for the benefit of
four separate beneficiaries. Under the will the executors were given
a large discretion as to what property of T's would be used for paying
his debts, expenses and legacies. After T's death the trust under the
trust deed still continued and a large surplus arose. The trustees
having no discretion as to what to do with the surplus, that Is to say,
they could only do one of two things, turn it over to the executors
under the will or to T's heirs at law, brought this action for instruc-
tions by the court. The court held that the surplus under the trust
deed went to the heirs at law and did not pass under T's will. It said
that the dispositions made by T under his will were by their very
IT Gassinger v. Thillman, 160 Md. 194, 153 At. 19 (1931).
8 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Halsted, 245 N. Y. 447, 157 N. E. 739
(1927).
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nature so Inconsistent with the subject of the power under the deed,
that by necessary implication T could not and did not intend that the
will should be an execution of the power.
Considering the fact, as the court did, that the testamentary trus-
tees had a discdetion in collecting T's estate for the payment of his
debts, legacies, etc., whereas the trustees under the deed could only
pay the surplus thereunder to those appointed by T's will or to the
heirs, also the fact that T could not have possibly supposed that if
the executors had have chosen the surplus under the deed for the sum
out of which the creditors were to be paid and that they would have
to wait for several years for their money, it seems that the court was
right in saying that T had no intention of his will being an execution
of the power under the deed and hence the heirs were properly en-
titled to the surplus.
A very recent Massachusetts case," seems to be the only other
case in which a contrary intention has been found. T by his will
made several specific bequests. By the residuary clause of the will he
gave to certain trustees the rest of the property for, inter alios' thir-
teen named charities as beneficiaries, subject however, to a life estate
from the income to be paid to his wife. It then provided that 4t her
death she was empowered to appoint.by her will the whole residuary
trust property only on the condition that she deemed the said chari-
ties as having become unfit to receive the property. W left a will in
which she had made certain specific bequests. By the residuary clause,
she gave all the rest of her property in trust to . She made a special
provision in it that under no consideration was her residuary prop-
erty to fall below the sum of ten thousand dollars and that before it
should other legacies should abate to prevent it. She made no men-
tion of the power under her husband's will. The question before the
court was whether the residuary clause was an execution of the power
in view of the Massachusetts rule. The court said that she had a
contrary Intention. and that the will was not an execution of the
power. Two reasons were given which the court says shows a con-
trary intention. The first one was the fact that the charities named
had not in fact become unworthy since her husband's death and that
it would be unreasonable to suppose that W considered them all un-
worthy without mentioning it. The second reason was shown in the
fact that W expressly provided that under no condition should her
residuary property fall below $10,000 which shows that she had in
mind at the time her own property since that under the husband's
will at all times amounted to over $100,000.
It seems to the writer that the court correctly found that W did
have a contrary intention, but it does not seem that it should have
been necessary to inquire into this question. It will be remembered
that W only had the power to devise the residuary property under
T's will on the happening of the contingency that she deemed the
"Worcester Bank & Trust Co. v. Sibley,-Mass.-, 192 N. E. 31
(1934).
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charities as having become unworthy of the property. Hence by T's
will the beneficiaries got a defeasible title to the property. Now as
the only way the contingency can arise is by W expressly saying that
she deems the charities unworthy," and as she did not so state in her
will that they were, no power arises for her to execute, hence only
her'own property passes by her will.
It has been held that a contrary intention will not be implied from
that fact that the testator may have been in doubt as to the amount
of the income, which the property passing under the will, would pro-
duce.n So In the principal case the fact that T made certain small
legacies on the condition of the value of the estate not falling below
$100,000 did not show a contrary intention not to exercise the power.
The court properly suggested that probably T had in mind at that
time the fluctuations of the value of the property and was not re-
ferring to his own small estate he had apart from that under the
power.
H~ARY Poran DiEs.
AGENCY-DISTINCTION BETWEEN "WITHIN THE COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT" AND "WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT"
One Is faced with a somewhat confusing problem when trying to
differentiate, both in point of fact and in point of law, between the
terms, "within the course of employment" and "within the scope of
employment." Text-writers on agency and the courts in their de-
cisions are pleased to use first one and then the other, until a student
or even a practitioner who is confronted with an agency problem, is
ultimately baffled as to the exact meaning and application of the two
terms as tests of the master's liability for the torts of his agent. In
volume two, section 1879 of Mechem's work on Agency, Mr. Mechem
selects the phrase "within the course of his employment" and uses it
to mean and include, admittedly for the want of a better term, the
separate and distinct meanings of the two phrases, "within the course
of his employment" and "within the scope of his employment". The
meaning of the words in the former phrase is as that of those in the
"Garman v. Glass, 197 Pa. 101, 64 AtI. 923 (1900). G devised
property to his wife for life, with remainder to others, with provision
that, if they should not be obedient to her, he revokes the devise to
them and empowers her to devise the property. The court said that
there must be an affrmative decision and declaration of their dis-
obedience, to entitle her to exercise the power, and it is not shown by
a devise by her of the "residue" of her property; and until determina-
tion that the contingency on which the power may be exercised had
arisen. This is true notwithstanding a statute embodying the Massa-
chusetts rule. The court said that the statute does not apply.
2'Art's Student League of N. Y. v. Hinkley, 31 Fed. (2d) 469
(1929).
